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In and Out of Place:
Civilizational Interaction and the Making of Australia in Oceania and Asia
Jeremy C. A. Smith
Abstract
The making of Euro-Australia occurred against the backdrop of two dimensions of its
historical constitution. First, it occurred on the back of Britain’s entry into the
Oceanian world and its intercivilizational encounters with Pacific cultures. The second
dimension was the appropriation of the land of a complex and internally diverse
Aboriginal civilization and suppression of its social world view. This was vital to a
lasting sense of ambivalence in Australian identity and in the relations of the
Commonwealth of Australia with island states in the Pacific. After Federation (1901),
Australia became more independent in the context of devolution of the Commonwealth.
Engagement in the Pacific War heralded a turn from allegiance to Britain to alliance
with the United States. A new orientation to the Asia-Pacific was not a chosen course,
but one compelled by geo-political conditions and a growing dynamism in this multicivilizational world region. From the 1970s to the end of the twentieth century,
engagement in Asia accelerated with the onset of a policy regime of multiculturalism
and a process of neo-liberal modernization.
This essay argues that Euro-Australia emerged out of complex intercivilizational
interactions entailing colonialism, diverse migratory and cultural flows, and the
creation of a homogenizing collective memory. I contend that Australian modernity,
due in part to its suppression of its indigenous civilization and accompanying denial of
that suppression, has borne considerable cultural and political ambivalence about its
place in the region — an ambivalence which structures its economic and political
relations with neighbouring countries. In this essay, I focus on Pacific relations. I
compare developments and turns in Australian foreign policy with patterns of cultural
engagement since the 1970s. Towards the end, I raise the Australian regime of refugee
detention in relation to climate refugees. The essay concludes with notes on the merits
of civilizational analysis in understanding the Oceanian constellation and its potential
futures and points for further research on Australia in a multi-civilizational context.
Introduction
This essay addresses two lacunae in civilizational analysis. First, it makes a small
attempt to repair the neglect of the Pacific in civilizational analysis. Second, it turns to
the making of Euro-Australia as a general feature of the interaction of civilization and,
more precisely, as a middle power in relation to the Pacific civilizational world.
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My specific argument is that, due to the character of its colonial conquest of Aboriginal
civilization, Australian modernity has borne considerable cultural and political
ambivalence about its place in the region — an ambivalence which structures its
economic and political relations with neighbouring countries. I prosecute this
argument in three parts.
First, I briefly sketch my concept of intercivilizational engagement as a reconstruction
of Benjamin Nelson’s and Johann Árnason’s theories of intercivilizational encounters.
Second, I present the case for considering the Pacific as a civilization in its own right
(Árnason 2003, Nelson and Huff 1981, Árnason, Eisenstadt, and Wittrock 2005,
Árnason and Hann 2018, Árnason 1997). This sets up a discussion of the legacies of
intercivilizational interaction that influenced the formation of Euro-Australia.
In a third part, I argue that Australian culture exhibits an ambivalence towards the
Pacific region and issues from the conditions of its formation and the ongoing political
and commercial vision of the Pacific as a ‘deficient’ region in need of neoliberal
reconstruction. The theoretical re-orientation is crucial to understanding the basis for
the ambivalent relationship with the Pacific that Australia has. I conclude with notes
on the merits of civilizational analysis in pursuing further research on the Australian
relationship with a multi-civilizational Asia-Pacific.
The theoretical component on intercivilizational interaction comes in an abbreviated
form. Elsewhere, I elaborate the argument for the utility of the concept of
intercivilizational engagement (Smith 2017). In this essay, I condense a great deal of
material from the book into a short passage. My variation of the notion of
intercivilizational encounters draws on a number of sources of critical inspiration: S.
N. Eisenstadt, Nelson, Árnason, and Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1994, Eisenstadt 2003,
Nelson and Huff 1981, Árnason 2003, Ben Rafael, Sternberg, and Eisenstadt 2005).
Cornelius Castoriadis is not a known civilizationalist, but his ontology of the imaginary
institution of society resonates clearly with the objectives of civilizational analysis, as
Árnason so capably argues (Castoriadis 1987). Readers of Comparative Civilizations
Review will be familiar with Nelson.
In this passage, I generalize Árnason’s elucidation of intercivilizational encounters.
Taking Nelson and others fully into account, Arnason argues that ‘mutually formative
relations between civilizational complexes’ constitute civilizations (Árnason 2003,
p.287). Árnason follows Nelson, while also revising his earlier formulations. For
Árnason, the crucial question is what makes specific civilizations more open to
confrontation with other sociocultural constellations? Encounters that take place in
multi-civilizational zones and have an impact are especially important. Arnason also
brings in economic and political factors to supplement cultural ones.
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Following Nelson and Árnason, but also going beyond them, I emphasize deeper
connections between different constellations. Globalisation analysis might stress
connections between nations and blocs in the post-war world of the twentieth century.
However, globalization analysis rarely highlights the longer histories of interregional
connectivity. For this reason alone, civilizational analysis is more appealing. The
transactions between civilizations are, overall, deeper than many of the major accounts
than globalization analysis has suggested.
With Árnason, I contend that civilizations become meaningful at points of intersection.
Historical patterns of connection and obstruction produce a remarkable diversity of
linkages. Seen from this point of view, it is possible to define my main concept.
Intercivilizational engagement is the regularisation of contact and encounter.
To quote from my more extensive elaboration of the concept:
(Intercivilizational engagement) has a heavier gravity in the structures of daily
existence. Regularised contacts and connections over long historical periods are
of a different order to encounters. Where encounters are treated analytically as
episodic and time-bound forms of interaction, inter-civilizational engagement can
be applied as a problematic of the connectedness of world regions, societies and
cultures over a longer duration. Of course, there are differing degrees of intercivilizational engagement just as encounters differ widely in the significance that
the literature attributes to them. Be that as it may, there are precious few societies
and civilisations that have been isolated from inter-cultural contact altogether or
that have completely closed and fixed symbolic borders for lasting periods of time.
(Smith 2017, p.81)
My methodology takes the reader into examples and case studies of intercivilizational
engagement across four dimensions of collective life: migration, deep engagement in
economic relations, cultural exchange, and transformative borrowing of models of
polity.
I distinguish this from encounters in the following way. Theorists of encounters rightly
emphasize mutually formative engagement as ground-breaking. In their eyes,
intercivilizational encounters have wider and lasting ramifications. The accent falls on
the intensity of periods of what I call deep intercivilizational engagement. However,
the regularised contacts and connections over long historical periods are of a different
order to encounters, especially across the four dimensions. I operationalize the concept
in case studies of Latin America, Japan, and the Pacific.
In considering the Pacific, some comments on the civilizational background of
connectivity are called for. I begin by noting that the Pacific figures all too rarely in
discussions of civilization and intercivilizational encounters.
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The field can amend that situation. Archaeologists, anthropologists, and historians
have developed a scholarship of engagement, which magnifies the civilizational
character of the Pacific world (Matsuda 2012, Scarr 1990, Shilliam 2015).
Moreover, indigenous movements, artists, and political and community leaders have
given voice to the longer and distinct precolonial history of engagement. They are
leaders in the recovery and reconstruction of identity and a form of cultural and
historical memory that demarcates islands of the Pacific as a distinct imaginary and
civilizational constellation.
Intercivilizational engagement took the form of: (a) three great waves of migration, the
first beginning as far back as 40000 years BP; (b) reciprocal inter-island exchange; (c)
a rich and complex cosmology comprised on multiple traditions of legend, adding up
to a common fund of myths of creation, movement and settlement; and, (d) transfer of
models of rule and power within groups of islands. Over millennia, these added up to
a paradigm of connection. Here is an old world that was already relational when
Europeans first intruded on the seas of the Pacific.
In their landmark anthropologies of the Pacific, Marcel Mauss and Bronislav
Malinowski had small but sufficient and important insights into the moral ontology,
social relations, and material life of Pacific Islander civilization. Their published
ethnographies of the complexity of islander cultures and their ethnographic surveys did
much to illuminate key aspects of this civilization, especially for non-Oceanian
audiences.
By the time Mauss and Malinowski published their findings, British and French
colonialism had violently disordered this civilization, although far from completely.
Since the 1960s, there has been a reconstruction of historical and cultural memory in
the Pacific, which has been possible due to the upsurge in indigenous activism and the
revival in the arts and the human sciences.
Viewed from the point of view of this history of a connected Pacific world, Australia
is a peculiar case. The British colonized the southern continent as part of the thrust
into Asia and in a counter-move to growing French interest in the South Pacific.
Scientific pursuits were a stimulus to the incursion also. Within comparative
civilizational analysis, there are three reasons to treat Australia as a distinct case:
1. The British expropriation of the Aboriginal civilization had no identical
counterpart in the world. Unlike other colonized lands, British authorities never
settled any treaty on which a legal contest of sovereignty could take place. The
Australian state has not settled a treaty either.
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Since none exists, Australia is quite exceptional in terms of ‘fourth world’
societies. For much of Euro-Australian history, the state has utterly suppressed
Aboriginal civilization in the national memory.
A multifaceted Australian war upon Aboriginal society was first challenged in
the late 1930s, and then again in the 1960s and since. A significant shift has
occurred in the discipline and practice of Australian history, with revisionist
currents re-writing this past and to some degree altering the national education
curriculum. There are ramifications for wider historiographical practice, and
Australian perspectives on historiography have been part of the debate on postcolonial identity in other settler-colonizer countries of the Commonwealth.
2. Although the British had an accumulated history of colonization from their
historical experiences in North America and the early gains of their trading
empire in India and Asia, the British initially understood contexts outside of the
Pacific far better. The new antipodean colonies were a laboratory for
experiments in creating governmental institutions alongside of a nascent
Victorian-era social order. Cities arose rapidly. In some instances, colonial
leaders based newly founded settlements on Victorian urban design and built
up public infrastructure in accordance with a Victorian vision of orderly
civilized life. Victorian cities were the creative mark of the British colonies on
the mainland southern continent.
3. After Federation, Australia assumed a neo-colonial role in the region. The
largest state in the region continued in that vein in a formal military alliance
signed in 1952 — the ANZUS alliance with the United States and New Zealand.
As a middle-power in world terms, Australian governments enjoyed
disproportionate influence in the Pacific, an influence not replicated in Asia,
where Australia is a member of the ASEAN security treaty with comparable
and confident partners.
That is a brief summary, which calls for more elaboration. Prior to British claims on
the southern land, an immensely diverse Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander imagery
had flourished. That civilization had rich relationships to the north of the continent
through the islands up to Timor and beyond. The conquest and internal colonisation of
Aboriginal civilization fostered the fiction and the myth of an ‘empty’ state of
uninhabited lands.
Of course, the southern continent had been occupied and shaped by Aboriginal people
for tens of thousands of years. British colonialism and the federated Commonwealth
of Australia that succeeded it were in denial of the presence and civilization of
Aboriginal First Nations.
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Based on coastal observations of the southern continent by Banks and Matra, who
were botanists on board Captain James Cook’s reconnaissance of the east coast of
the continent in 1770, the British government invoked a paradox: the Aboriginal
peoples sighted on the coast were rendered invisible on the assumption that the
interior was entirely uninhabited. The British considered it their right — the land
being apparently uninhabited — to claim full ownership, since no prior ownership
could be established or claimed (Rundell 2004, p.202, p.206).

So began the myth of terra nullius, a legal fiction that the land was empty of culture
and civilization and that therefore there was no prior sovereign people with which to
negotiate a treaty. In the nineteenth century, the judiciary reaffirmed terra nullius in
five separate judgements and legislative acts. This underpinned the wider resonance
that the image of the empty land had in Australian culture.
Yet, the Aboriginal presence remained as a troubling reminder of the colonial past and
colonizing present. In the first half of the twentieth century, many Australians
reassured themselves of the moral worth of the civilizing mission by deeming that the
Aboriginal race was ‘dying out’ and that the Christian duty was to ease the passing of
Aboriginality through Christian education in the manners, language and customs of
white Australia. Combined with frontier violence against Aboriginal people in the
nineteenth and even early twentieth centuries, this amounted to a ‘war’ on Aboriginal
civilization.
The legal fiction of terra nullius came to haunt the national mindset, with the growing
sense of doubt about the foundational basis of white Australia. In the post-war period,
and particularly from the 1960s onwards, critical challenges to the dominant historical
understanding of the foundational story shed light on the undeclared war on the
peoples, signs, semiotics and Dreamtime cosmology of Australian Aboriginal
civilization.
This was one critical side of the process of making white civilization in Australia.
Civilization-making coincided with Australian modernity. In other words, EuroAustralia was ‘born modern’.
Being a modern society from the outset, and yet one at war with the ancient Aboriginal
civilization it had supplanted, created a strange cultural condition of uncertain and
ambivalent belonging (Beilharz and Smith 1997). Deep ambivalence epitomises
cultural perceptions in Australia, partly because of the occlusion of the colonial
conquest. Australian modernity has rested on the problem of how to combine a denied
Aboriginal old world with a new world that has no antiquity, no Middle Ages and no
revolutionary foundation — in other words, none of the foundations of other states with
which it might be compared.
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Thus, there was no political foundation like that possessed by many European and
Asian societies, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union in particular.
Contrasting the deep temporality of the Aboriginal Dreamtime — with its stories of
Creation from land and sea in a distant undated past — is a Euro-Australian historical
memory of two short centuries. No other contrast of antique and modern civilizations
is as sharp as this one.
Of course, Australia did have two British myths as a backdrop to its constitution
(Rundell 2004).
The first was that Australia was terra nullius, as discussed above. It was the official
doctrine of British colonial rule and then of the government in federated Australia.
More importantly, terra nullius penetrated deeply into Australian cultural life. When
combined with the second foundational myth (that the southern continent would host a
‘new’ white society based on an imported British constitutional tradition), the basis for
racism was set.
As Aboriginal social movements asserted the living presence of indigenous civilization
and as the Australian population diversified, the two myths have steadily been
destabilized. With the adoption of multiculturalism in the 1970s, the lasting culture of
Australian racism started to erode. Although multiculturalism is a complex and
multidimensional problematic beyond this essay (but see Castles, Haas, and Miller
2014, pp.166-8), one short comment is necessary. Official multiculturalism, as
formulated and practiced by Federal and State Governments, is a cultural dimension of
a wider process of neo-liberal modernization. It was a crucial component of neoliberalism — a process that came earlier to Australia than many other countries in the
OECD.
Notwithstanding the undertow of revision of Australian identity, Euro-Australia still
struggles with its past, a struggle that reverberates in debates about the cultural,
collective and historical memory. Irresolution of the historical issues inhibits efforts to
tackle social problems of the present. Aboriginal communities suffer acutely from high
levels of unemployment, unconscionable disparities in health and education, and
confrontations with the criminal justice system.
Questions of sovereignty in Aboriginal affairs hang over all this. There is more success
in multiculturalism, but as with other polities with multiculturalist regimes of
management of ethnic diversity, a populist backlash based on white identity has
occurred since the late 1990s. Even so, right-wing populism has not entered the
mainstream in the manner it did in the United States in 2016. There is no Australian
Trump.
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These are the cultural, historical and political settings for engagement with the Pacific
since the 1970s. Australia inherited a political economy in the region based on the
extraction of resources and has sustained the asymmetrical relationship. Like other
powers, Australia engaged in the infamous practice of ‘blackbirding’ in the nineteenth
century by seizing Pacific Islanders and transferring them to Australia to work as
coerced labourers. For affected Pacific Islands, the result was a wave of depopulation.
While there has been no repeat of such dehumanizing practices, the terms of trade
between Australia and Pacific producers remain profoundly unequal. An export trade
in copra, guano, phosphate, sugar and coffee were at the heart of the plantation
economy run by Australian and New Zealand companies. Towards the end of the
twentieth century, mining, fishing and logging reached unsustainable levels on many
islands, especially Fiji, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, wrecking terrestrial and
marine environments.
To avoid a one-sided analysis at this stage, I wish to also point to the multidimensional
complexity of economic transactions, the patterns of land ownership, and some
ontological aspects of economic relations between Australia and the Pacific. In this
respect, it is important to keep the breadth of the process of intercivilizational
engagement in the picture. The extractive logic of Australian capital is inseparable
from the historical inter-connexion of Pacific and Eurasian worlds.
As Marshall Sahlins eloquently argues, islanders bring their own experiences of
exchange to economic relations with larger powers (Sahlins 1989). In Hawaii and
throughout Polynesia, island societies negotiated the goods, networks and hierarchies
of Western intruders. The intercultural character of economic engagement continued
to involve exchanges in values and obligations, as well as exchange of goods and
services. Those instances of reciprocal exchange may well fall under the constellation
of worldwide capitalist trade patterns and their long chains of connection.
Still, there are limits to the integration of the economic culture of reciprocity.
Limitations to the takeover of the ways of islander life by developmental patterns are
evident in the ongoing advice of economists at the end of the twentieth century that
Pacific Islanders need to embrace the capitalist spirit more (Dirlik 1998, 1997, pp.12933). To the extent that Pacific patterns of economic culture persist, then the “social
centrality of the ancient practice of reciprocity — the core of all oceanic cultures”
remains in a complex and incomplete relationship to the economic orders of capitalism,
as a Tongan artist, anthropologist, and advocate notes (Hauʹofa 2008, p.36).
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The economic cultural complex of Pacific civilization has limited direct influence on
Australian capital and the Australian state. Australia in the 1960s retreated from
trusteeships in the Cook Islands and Nauru and, a little later, Papua New Guinea. In
the wake of the decolonisation of Vanuatu, Tonga, Fiji, Western Samoa and the
Solomon Islands, Australian policy cast the Pacific as a zone of few economic
prospects, heightened political instability and pending environmental decline.
In the political discourse on the Pacific in Australia, there is no equivalent of the
American imagination of the Pacific as a multipolar ‘rim’ of states surrounding the
‘empty’ ocean that has no centre (Dirlik 1998). Australian foreign policy casts the
Pacific instead as a region. In the Australian imagination, the whole zone is still
‘deficient’, but with definite places and contents, for which Australia is responsible.
While the Australian polity has restructured itself around a coalescing model of
neoliberal modernization, political leaders, policy advisors, some journalists, business
spokespeople, and even some NGOs have projected the standards of neoliberal
governance to nascent states as the only viable developmental model. As Jolly states,
they have arrived at the categorical view that Pacific states “need to open their
economies; effect structural change and good governance; abolish customary land
tenure and inappropriate, undemocratic traditions; and connect with the dynamism of
Asia” (Jolly 2007, p.527).
With that outlook, fear of the absolute marginalisation of the Pacific from globalising
processes has guided Australian governments in their development, aid and foreign
policies. The worst fear in this respect lies in the nightmare of “failed states.”
Consequently, Australian governments calibrate diplomatic and foreign policy settings
on the belief that Pacific states are flawed. Irrespective of political persuasion, all
Federal Governments since the mid-1970s have acted within a paradigm of neoliberal
economic development for the region.
Though responsive to claims of neo-colonialism, Australia acts paternalistically as aid
donor, security expert in geo-strategic affairs, major investor and source of tourism,
and neighbouring military power. Its entire vision of the Pacific centers on Australia
leading Pacific states to a viable developmental path. As Jolly maintains, the relevant
policy settings have Australia “both as model and saviour of the Pacific, its future and
its prophet” (Jolly 2007, p.527).
As discussed above, in an early passage of this essay, Árnason’s approach to
intercivilizational encounters emphasizes the interchange, transactions, and even
encounters between different cultures, even in situations of great asymmetry. Noting
this, I point out that there is another and less often acknowledged side to the regional
political economy. Epeli Hauʹofa highlights it in his 1990s project of ‘New Oceania’.
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During that period, he asserted economic self-reliance, mutual ownership of land,
movement and connectivity as elements of a millennia-old identity, precisely those
elements of Pacific civilization that Australian governments have regarded as
obstructions in the modernization and globalization process.
In displacing the deficit image of the Pacific, Hauʹofa inserts a vision of a densely
connected network of island societies with histories that can serve islanders’ pursuit of
greater sovereign control (Hauʹofa et al. 1993). He casts this as the alternative to the
historical narratives told by Western states (Hauʹofa 2008, pp.60-79). In other words,
the political and cultural resources that the Tongan intellectual is alluding to are, as a
whole, nothing less than “the historicity of the indigenous peoples themselves and,
therefore, their contemporaneity” (Dirlik 1997, p.140).
Memory is especially important in this context, not because the past is readily
accessible and recoverable in a naïve positivist sense, but because islander values are
being pressed into the service of contemporary projects of sustainable development and
cultural renewal (Dirlik 1997, p.141). Pacific Islanders are reconstructing memories,
whether cultural and public memory or communicative and popular memory. Both are
involved in the potential reconfiguration of power according to Hauʹofa.
The regional context that Hauʹofa is working in is a world of motion, with people, ideas,
values and goods all on the move (Scarr 1990, Matsuda 2012).
The values, practices, and relationality of Oceania find a place in Australia via four
areas of contemporary engagement: diasporic migration to Australasia and California,
greater travel and communication, acquisition of property and jobs in Australia, and
popularization of the visual arts, film, literature and music.
As a category of migration, Oceania had the greatest percentage of international
immigrants of any world region (Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014, p.166). The lion’s
share of islander movement involves islanders travelling to New Zealand and Australia,
whether in travel or to re-settle. The critical impact of climate change will undoubtedly
accelerate those movements. It may already be doing so.
Economically, Polynesian regional networks exercise an informal regional economy
comprising a circulation of goods and monies between island homes and emigrants
living in New Zealand and on the eastern seaboard of Australia. Not only is money
remitted — a sure sign of dependency, when that is all that is transacted — but a vast
array of objects, technology materials and symbolic foodstuffs flow back and forth in
consignments. The informal trade circuit is reminiscent of ‘old’ Pacific more than new
developmental strategies.
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The general pattern re-creates elements of the reciprocity of economic and cultural
engagement of Oceanian civilization. I want to highlight the fact that migration
continues in patterns reminiscent of great traditions of travel. Migration and travel of
this kind is consonant with Pacific Islander efforts to construct cultural memory.
Civilizational analysis can capture the multivalence of this regional context well. To
be sure, Australia as a middle power dominates regional affairs and sets a political
model for the Pacific. Yet, within the regional field of power, islander agency, meaning
and reconstructed memory have impact and alter the terms of power.
On the other side, civilizational analysis can bring out the contradictions of antipodean
modernity. Australia is far from reconciled to a Pacific identity with which the nation
could engage culturally and on political and economic terms that are reciprocal. The
cruel current day practice of shipping asylum seekers to offshore detention centers in
Nauru and in PNG betray the inconsistencies in Australian foreign policy.
On one hand, Australian political discourse focuses on regional leadership and
partnerships with island states. On the other hand, the acid-test issue of refugees is
resolved through treatment of immediate neighbours as extra-territorial holding pens
for excluded asylum seekers. More than in any other area of policy, Australian
governments project ambivalence here about their entire relationship with the Pacific.
In doing so, they reflect a more general ambivalence of place.
Conclusion
Terra Australis would be British, but other than Britain; Oceanian, but a huge continent,
not an island; connected through its north (in a deep Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander history as well as through contemporary globalization) but populated in a
different and much older migration than the voyaging patterns that created Polynesia.
The short history of Euro-Australia contrasts with a long Aboriginal civilizational
history and sense of place so strong that it has survived colonialism. Pacific Islander
societies also have a longer history and current day projects of cultural renewal and
reconstruction of memory. Both Australia and the individual states of the Pacific are
part of greater civilizational constellations constituted in engagement. Consequently,
they engage with each other in and through contrasts.
Can Australian modernity adapt to place through intercivilizational encounters? The
question is one for further research. Two preliminary points can foreshadow future
work in this area. Australia sits in flows of engagement across the four dimensions of
migration, economic connectedness, adaption of political models, and cultural traffic.
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However, engagement with Aboriginal and Oceanian civilizations has not involved
learning encounters conducive to a strong sense of antipodean place that incorporates
a sensitivity to the ecology of the southern land, or the constitutive and living traditions
of the region.
Still lacking place-specific learning processes, Australian modernity looks ill-equipped
to meet the decisive challenge of our times: climate change and creating a new
civilizational base for sustainability (see Camilleri 1976). A full reconciliation with
the peoples of the region in the present is a prerequisite to a sustainable orientation for
the future. Finding a new direction is urgently necessary.
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Árnason, Jóhann Páll. 2003. Civilizations in dispute : historical questions and
theoretical traditions, International comparative social studies. Leiden; Boston:
Brill.
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